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Charter Schools, Academy Schools, and RelatedParty Transactions: Same Scams, Different
Countries
Preston C. Green III
Chelsea E. Connery
INTRODUCTION
In the course of the last quarter century, governmental
entities in both the United States and England have sought to
encourage educational innovation by creating publicly funded
schools that are independent from many of the rules that apply
to locally controlled schools. These schools are called charter
schools in the United States and academy schools (academies) in
England.1 Private companies run a high percentage of these
charter schools and academies. In the United States, these
companies are commonly referred to as educational
management organizations (EMOs).2
In England, these
organizations are called academy trusts (ATs).3
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1. Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, Lessons for US Charter Schools from the
Growth
of
Academies
in
England,
BROOKINGS
(Nov.
3,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/lessons-for-us-charter-schools-from-the-growth-ofacademies-in-england/ [https://perma.cc/LGB2-GNTN].
2. BRUCE BAKER & GARY MIRON, THE BUSINESS OF CHARTER SCHOOLING:
UNDERSTANDING THE POLICIES THAT CHARTER OPERATORS USE FOR FINANCIAL
BENEFIT
7
(Dec.
2015),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/rb_bakermiron_charter_revenue_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MPH-2TRQ].
3. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017: FOR ACADEMIES, MULTIACADEMY
TRUSTS
AND
MAINTAINED
SCHOOLS
43
(Jan.
2017),
https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/28078/ [https://perma.cc/FW7A-KPT6].
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EMOs and ATs frequently engage in related-party
transactions for a number of services including educational
technology, real estate, and consulting. 4
Related-party
transactions are business deals between companies with special,
pre-existing relationships.5 These arrangements can occur, for
example, between affiliated companies or a parent company and
its subsidiaries. 6 Although related-party transactions are legal,
they can create harmful conflicts of interest.7 As a result, in
both the charter and academy sectors, governmental entities
have created monitoring systems to protect against wasteful and
fraudulent related-party transactions.8
However, despite the existence of these monitoring
systems, numerous instances of problematic related-party
transactions have occurred in charter schools and academies.
Using comparative legal research methodologies, this article
attempts to explain why the monitoring systems of each domain
have such a difficult time regulating related-party transactions.
Following an explanation of the methods, Section II investigates
the prominent role EMOs and ATs play in the expansion of
charter schools and academies. Subsequently, Section III
examines data on EMO and AT engagement in related-party
transactions and presents examples of EMOs and ATs abusing
the legality of these transactions. These two sections together
demonstrate the need to consider how these organizations are
monitored. In Section IV we then analyze the current systems in
place to monitor related-party transactions in charter schools and
academies and make suggestions for improvement.

4. We discuss related-party transactions in charter schools and academies in more
detail in Section II.
5. ART BERKOVITZ & RICHARD RAMPELL, RELATED -P ARTY TRANSACTIONS CAN
BE
AN
INVESTMENT
RED
FLAG
(Aug.
29,
2002),
https://www.artberkowitz.com/article7.htm [https://perma.cc/6G97-XZND].
6. See generally AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS., AU SECTION 334:
RELATED
P ARTIES
1961,
1961
n.1,
https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Archived/Pages/AU334.aspx [https://perma.cc/3TFH-8V2T]
(last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
7. Elizabeth A. Gordon, Related Party Transactions and Corporate Governance, 9
CORP. GOV. ADVANCES IN FIN. ECON. 1, 7 (2004) (explaining the conflict of interest view
of related-party transactions).
8. We analyze these related-party-transaction monitoring systems in Section III.
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I. Methodology
To achieve the goals of this article, we apply the
comparative legal research methodology of functionalism.
Functionalism examines the approaches that different legal
systems use to solve conflicts.9 This methodology looks for
“functional equivalents” that countries have developed to solve a
particular problem. 10 Despite the countries’ legal differences,
their solutions may be similar or even identical. 11
Functionalism is especially appropriate for the comparison
made in this article because the United States and England have
similar, common-law legal systems. 12
However, merely
comparing the legal rules for each country may be insufficient
because of contextual differences.13 Therefore, we supplement
the functional method by employing the law-in-context
method.14 The goal of the law-in-context method is to discern
how the different legal concepts work in practice. 15 Thus, we
have included analysis of the following materials: (1)
educational, legal, and accounting research articles pertaining to
charter schools and academies; (2) governmental reports and
audits of charter schools and academies; and (3) media
investigations of problematic related-party transactions in the
charter school and academy sectors.

9. Mark Van Hoecke, METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 1, 9,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291373684_Methodology_of_
Comparative_Legal_Research [https://perma.cc/83K9-SCYE] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Van Hoecke, supra note 9, at 16.
15. Id.
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II. The Role that EMOs and ATs Play in the Expansion
of Charter Schools and Academies
A. Charter Schools
Since 1991, 44 states and the District of Columbia have
passed charter school legislation.16 The argument for the initial
creation of charter schools was that, with their greater flexibility,
these schools could foster necessary innovations in the public
education system. 17 Charter schools operate under a contract, or
charter, with a charter school authorizer.18 The charter specifies
the organization and the management of the school as well as
measures for academic success.19 There are more than 7,000
charter schools that educate more than 3 million students 20—6%
of the nation’s public-school population.21
Charter schools have grown steadily over the past 10 years,
adding 300 to 400 schools each year. 22 EMO-operated charter
schools have also become more prominent. 23 EMOs are forprofit or non-profit companies that contract with charter school
boards to provide educational and management services to
charter schools.24 In 2009-10, EMOs managed around 30% of
charter schools and educated 35% of charter school students
16. Micah Ann Wixon, 50-State Comparison Charter School Policies, EDUC.
COMM’N
STATES
(2018),
https://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/
[https://perma.cc/Z5SK-BVR3].
17. Claudio Sanchez, Just What Is a Charter School, Anyway?, Mar. 1, 2017,
NPRED,
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/03/01/511446388/just-what-is-a-charterschool-anyway [https://perma.cc/F2RZ-D4RC].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Rebecca David & Kevin Hesla, Estimated Public Charter School Enrollment,
2017-18,
NAT’L
ASS’N
PUB.
CHARTER
SCHS
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/documents/201803/FINAL%20Estimated%20Public%20Charter%20School%20Enrollment%2C%20201718.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9PJ-XLG6].
21. Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics., Public Charter School Enrollment, THE CONDITION
OF EDUCATION (Mar. 2018), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/ indicator_cgb.asp
[https://perma.cc/CSN7-MSV2].
22. Sarah Cohodes, Charter Schools and the Achievement Gap, THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN
1
(Win.
2018),
https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/
sites/futureofchildren/files/resource-links/charter_schools_compiled.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PS7R-ZFTY].
23. BAKER & MIRON, supra note 2, at 7.
24. Id.
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nationwide. 25 In 2016-17, EMOs operated 35% of all charter
schools, constituting 42% of enrollment.26
The expansion of EMOs is not happenstance. In fact,
charter-school proponents believe that EMOs can achieve
expansion faster than stand-alone charter schools because of
economies of scale and “the development expertise needed to
secure financial expansion.”27 Philanthropic foundations have
played a significant role in promoting the growth of EMO-run
charter schools.28 In the 2000s, major philanthropic foundations
in the US dramatically increased funding to EMOs while
proportionately decreasing funding to traditional public
schools.29
Specifically, recent evidence suggests that
philanthropic foundations prefer to fund national-level advocacy
and EMOs to stimulate charter school growth.30 However, due
to the decentralized nature of the US education system,
foundations also direct significant funds to state and local
levels. 31
In addition to philanthropic organizations, the federal
government has recently promoted the growth of EMOs through
the Charter Schools Program (CSP), which allocates funding to
expand the number of “high-quality” charter schools in the
25. NAT’L ALLIANCE PUB. CHARTER SCHS., CMO AND EMO PUBLIC CHARTER
SCHOOLS: A GROWING P HENOMENON IN THE CHARTER SCHOOL SECTOR: PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL DASHBOARD DATA FROM 2007-08, 20-08-09, AND 2009-10 1,
http://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default/files/migrated/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/NAPCS-CMO-EMO-DASHBOARDDETAILS_20111103T102812.pdf [https://perma.cc/54A8-5HC7] (last visited Mar. 30,
2019).
26. REBECCA DAVID, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW:
2016-17
SCHOOL
YEAR
3,
https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/default
/files/documents/2018-08/napcs_management_report_web%20New%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8CJ-KDP5] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
27. Benjamin M. Teresa & Ryan M. Good, Speculative Charter School Growth in
the Case of UNO Charter School Network in Chicago, 54 URBAN AFF. REV. 1107, 1112
(2018).
28.
GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER SHANK, NEPC REVIEW: CHARTER
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 2017 (CREDO, JUNE 2017) 2 (Sep. 2017),
https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/reviews/TTR%20Miron%20CMOs_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6CL-7VWD].
29. Joseph J. Ferrare & R. Renee Setari, Converging on Choice: The Interstate Flow
of Foundation Dollars to Charter School Organizations, 47 EDUC. RESEARCHER 34, 34
(2017).
30. Id. at 35.
31. Id.
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country.32 In 2017, the federal government spent $253 million
pursuant to the CSP.33 Of that amount, $52 million went to a
newly created EMO-expansion program titled “Replication and
Expansion of High-Quality Charter Schools.” 34

B. Academies
Academies were first introduced in 2000 as the City
Academy Program. 35 City academies were to replace locally run
schools in urban areas that were deemed to be failing by the
school inspection body Ofsted, or that were underachieving.36
The Education Act 2002 permitted academies to open outside of
urban areas.37
Eight years later, Parliament enacted the Academies Act
2010.38 This statute extended the academy option, until then
limited to struggling schools, to include successful schools at
both the primary and secondary levels. 39 The government
financed conversion costs and provided considerable financial

32. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., WELCOME TO ED’S CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM (Oct. 16,
2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/csp/index.html [https://perma.cc/HK99LGR8].
33. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AWARDS $253 MILLION
IN
GRANTS
TO
EXPAND
CHARTER
SCHOOLS
(Sep.
28,
2017),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-awards-253-milliongrants-expand-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/683Z-PG4Z].
34.
NAT ’L ALLIANCE PUB. CHARTER SCHS., NATIONAL ALLIANCE
CONGRATULATES RECIPIENTS OF 2017 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CHARTER
SCHOOL PROGRAM GRANTS (Sep. 28, 2017), https://info.publiccharters.org/2017-charterschools-program-grantsannounced?ecid=ACsprvsAIXN9g7JhzoZquGUbt7vhg8_qrjBOOLxhu3JfSKMBQX5ZmjhH8qsdBHo1pLY6zNfC3kg&utm_source=hs_email&utm_
medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-95MEMh60-wrUIyiqAS50ZLtwVRXEKMYY
ACMPdlHBhrK9Hv2MmW9ad0dU_Mo8b1dKJN5YduORZHjl6xkV6licASXDDRMc0t5
R_0VJcCbuvQ_jSv-8g [https://perma.cc/HME2-8EDC].
35. Ann West & Elizabeth Bailey, The Development of the Academies Programme:
‘Privatising’ School-Based Education in England 1986-2013, 61 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD.
137, 143 (2013).
36. Id. at 144.
37. Id. at 145.
38. See
generally
Academy
Act
2010,
c.
32
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/32/pdfs/ukpga_20100032_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2U8-F7D2].
39. Id. § 3(1).
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incentives to encourage schools to convert.40 The number of
academies increased dramatically as a result of these policy
changes. In 2010, there were 203 academies throughout
England, all of them serving secondary schools with high
proportions of disadvantaged students.41 As of December 2018,
there were 8,333 academies, constituting 36.8% of England’s
state funded schools.42 About 67% of England’s secondary
schools and 30% of its primary schools have achieved academy
status.43
Academy trusts (ATs) run academies. 44 ATs are nonprofit
private trusts that enter into funding agreements with the
Secretary of State for Education.45 Single academy trusts
(SATs) “. . . run one academy and so have a single funding
agreement with the Secretary.” 46 Multi-academy trusts (MATs)
run more than one academy “and so have both a master funding
agreement with the Secretary . . . as well as a supplemental
funding agreements for each academy.” 47
The English government has supported the growth of
MATs in order to encourage the rapid expansion of academies. 48
One strategy involved funding: “The more schools in [a MAT],
the more funding was available for its central office activities.”49
This funding strategy worked. In 2012, there were 312 MATs,
which ran 39% of all academies.50 By 2015, almost two-thirds
of academies were in MATs, and 517 MATs had 2 to 5

40. Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, England Confronts the Limits of School
Autonomy 6 (Nat’l Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Educ., Working Paper 232) (Oct.
25,
2016),
https://ncspe.tc.columbia.edu/working-papers/OP232.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XV8Q-DAU8]; West & Bailey, supra note 35, at 139.
41. Ladd & Fiske, supra note 40, at 6.
42. DEP’T FOR EDUC., OPEN ACADEMIES, FREE SCHOOLS, STUDIO SCHOOLS AND
UTCS AND ACADEMY PROJECTS AWAITING APPROVAL: SEPTEMBER 2018 (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-academies-and-academy-projects-indevelopment#history.
43. Id.
44. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 43.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. LADD & FISKE, ENGLAND CONFRONTS THE LIMITS, supra note 40, at 6.
49. Id.
50. Melanie C.M. Ehren & David Godfrey, External Accountability of Collaborative
Arrangement; A Case Study of a Multi Academy Trust in England, 29 EDUC. ASSESSMENT
EVALUATION & ACCOUNTABILITY 339, 340 (2017).
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academies, 98 had 6 to 15, and 19 MATs were responsible for
16 or more academies.51 In 2017, MATs ran 73% of all
academies. 52
The role of MATs in academy expansion continues to be
encouraged by the Department for Education (DfE), the
governmental department responsible for education in
England.53 In 2016, the DfE, announced its full-throttled
support for MATs in a white paper titled Educational Excellence
Everywhere.54 This paper called for the academization of all
English schools by 2022. 55 Initially, the DfE intended this
transition to be mandatory, but, following strong resistance, the
DfE modified its approach to strong encouragement.56 The
white paper declared that MATs were the mechanism for
enabling the spread of academies because:
MATs are the only structures which formally bring together
leadership, autonomy, funding and accountability across a
group of academies in an enduring way, and are the best
long term formal arrangement for stronger schools to
support the improvement of weaker schools.57

The DfE provided several rationales for declaring this
belief.
For instance, MATs would provide “improved
opportunities and support for teachers” and “a broader
curriculum and more opportunities for children.” 58 MATs
would also help build infrastructure by “expand[ing] the reach
and influence of the most successful leaders” and offering “more
senior roles and rapid progression opportunities” so that “the
51. Id.
52. ANNE WEST & DAVID WOLFE, ACADEMIES, THE SCHOOL SYSTEM IN ENGLAND
AND A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 4 (June 2018), http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialpolicy/Assets/Documents/PDF/Research-reports/Academies-Vision-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6FY-VNVY].
53.
DEP’T FOR EDUC., ABOUT US, https://www.gov.uk /government/
organisations/department-for-education/about (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
54. DEP’T FOR EDUC., EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE EVERYWHERE (Mar. 2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/
attachment_data/file/508447/Educational_Excellence_Everywhere.pdf
[https://perma.cc/695Y-C9UW].
55. Id. at 15.
56. Andrew Eyles et al., Academies 2 – The New Batch: The Changing Nature of
Academy Schools in England, 39 FISCAL STUD. 121, 124 (2018).
57. DEP’T FOR EDUC., EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE EVERYWHERE, supra note 54, at
57.
58. Id. at 16.
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best leaders can play new, more influential roles across more
schools.”59 Moreover, the DfE claimed that MATs could
expand into high need areas in a manner that the best local
educational authorities never could. 60

III. EMOS, ATS, AND RELATED-PARTY
TRANSACTIONS AND EXAMPLES OF ABUSE
A. Charter Schools
In the United States, there is no nationwide compilation of
related-party transactions. However, the Grand Canyon Institute
performed an analysis of related-party transactions in Arizona
during the 2013-14 school year.61 This study found that 77% of
the state’s charter schools had engaged in related-party
transactions.62 Many of these transactions were between
nonprofit EMOs and for-profit related-parties, which called into
question the nonprofit nature of these EMOs. 63 Furthermore,
48% of charter school expenditures for contracts, leases, and
rents for that year were owed to for-profit related parties,
totaling $497.5 million.64
There have been many questionable related-party
transactions involving real estate deals.65 For example, a for59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 15.
61. CURTIS CARDINE & DAVE WELLS, FOLLOWING THE MONEY : TWENTY YEARS
OF CHARTER SCHOOL FINANCES IN ARIZONA (A META-ANALYSIS OF CHARTER SCHOOL
FINANCIALS AND WHAT THEY TELL US) 3,11,12 (Grand Canyon Institute, 2017)),
http://grandcanyoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/09/GCI-Policy-ReportFollowing-the-Money_Sept_17_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6D7-CC69].
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id. at 4.
65. See, e.g., Catherine Candisky, Ohio Taxpayers Paid $7.7 Million to Renovate
Charter-School Building Valued at $2.4 Million, COLUMBIA DISPATCH (July 30, 2018),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180729/ohio-taxpayers-paid-77-million-to-renovatecharter-school-building-valued-at-24-million
[https://perma.cc/B5D8-VKAP];
Academica’s Florida Real Estate Operations, IN THE PUB. INTEREST (June 2016),
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_Academica_Florida_Rese
arch_Brief_June_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/78SH-UA9W]; Ronald Huefner & Marie
Blouin, Control Issues in Charter Schools: An Examination of New York State
Comptroller’s
Audits,
CPA
J.
(Apr.
2018),
https://www.cpajournal.com
/2018/04/30/control-issues-in-charter-schools/; Jeremy Mohler, Charter Schools Are a Hot
Real Estate Market – and That’s Bad for Students, IN THE PUB. INTEREST (Oct. 18, 2018),
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profit EMO named Charter Schools USA (“CSUSA”), which
operates 49 charter schools in Florida, conducts its real estate
deals through several affiliated businesses. 66 The facilities costs
for CSUSA-managed schools were 32% of their budget—more
than 13% of the national average for charter school facilities
costs.67
The real estate deals between Imagine Schools, a non-profit
EMO that operates more than 60 schools, and its for-profit
affiliate, SchoolHouse Finance, are even more extreme. These
charter schools can spend up to 40% on rent, which creates a
tight budget for educational necessities, such as textbooks.68 In
Renaissance Academy for Math & Science of Missouri v.
Imagine Schools, a federal judge ordered Imagine Schools to
pay almost $1 million to one of its former schools for charging it
excessive rent.69 The court’s ruling suggested that Imagine
Schools was essentially taking advantage of the charter school:
the EMO profited from the excessive rent and failed to tell the
school’s board of directors how the cost might disrupt the
school’s ability to pay for textbooks and teacher salaries. 70
An audit conducted by the U.S. Department of Education’s
Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), the federal agency’s
watchdog, provided further evidence of the emerging danger.71
This audit, which assessed the risks posed by charter school
https://medium.com/in-the-public-interest/charter-schools-are-a-hot-real-estate-marketand-thats-bad-for-students-153fe8554bb4 [https://perma.cc/YV77-KHZ8]; Piet Van Lier,
Public Good vs. Private Profit: Imagine Schools, Inc. in Ohio, POLICY MATTERS OHIO 3
(May
2010),
http://www.policymattersohio.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/ImagineSchools2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BXZ-B49L].
66. Pat Hall & Sue Legg, The League in Action on For-Profit Charters
LWVEDUCATION (Oct. 1, 2016), http://lwveducation.com/the-league-in-action-on-forprofit-charters/ [https://perma.cc/FR3T-3B8Q].
67. Id.
68. Tim Walker, What the Charter School Industry Can Learn from Enron – Before
It’s Too Late, NEATODAY (Mar. 31, 2017), http://neatoday.org /2017/03/31/charterschools-second-coming-of-enron/ [https://perma.cc/A9CG-Y659].
69. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 24-25, Renaissance Acad. for Math
& Sci. of Mo. v. Imagine Schs., No. 4:13-CV-00645-NKL (W.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014),
http://courtweb.pamd.uscourts.gov/courtwebsearch/mowd/YgEGzNViWt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B2KT-MHUN].
70. Id. at 18-19.
71. Nationwide Assessment of Charter and Education Management Organizations:
Final Audit Report, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFF. INSPECT. GEN. (Sept. 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2016/a02m0012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KFV-6LU4].
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EMOs to the Department’s objectives, examined 33 charter
schools from six states: California, Florida, Michigan, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 72 The OIG found 36 instances
of internal control weaknesses—13 of these instances involved
related-party transactions.73 These weaknesses were concerning
because their presence increased the possibility of financial
fraud and abuse, and additionally, they increased the risk that
students would not receive services consistent with federal
program objectives.74

B. Academies
In contrast to charter schools, there are data regarding the
scope of related-party transactions in the academy sector. These
data show that related-party transactions are quite common. The
Education Funding Agency (“EFA”), the agency responsible for
academy oversight, found that 976 ATs—or 43%—had
disclosed related-party transactions during the 2012-13 school
year. 75 These transactions totaled £71 million. 76 In 2015-16,

72. Id. at 5, 8. The Office of Inspector General referred to both EMOs and charter
management organizations (“CMOs”) as CMOs. The OIG defined a CMO as “any
organization that operated or managed one or more schools, whether under contract or as
charter holders, without regard to the profit motive of the organization.” Id. at 1 n.1.
EMOs, by contrast, provide “whole school operation” services. Id. (inner quotations
omitted). For consistency purposes, we use the term EMO to refer to the entities described
in the audit.
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Review of Related Party Transactions in Academies, EDUC. FUND. AGENCY, 3
(Nov.
2014)
[hereinafter,
Review
of
Related
Party
Transactions],
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/governmen
t/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390
210/EFA_review_of_related_party_transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFL2-TAP5]. . In
2017, the Education Funding Agency merged with the Skills Agency to become the
Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA). Justine Greening, Department for
Education Agencies: Written statement - HCWS559, UK P ARLIAMENT (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/
written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2017-03-28/HCWS559/
[https://perma.cc/CG7K-6GT3].
76. Comptroller & Auditor General, Investigation into the Education Funding
Agency’s oversight of related party transactions at Durand Academy, NAT ’L AUDIT
OFFICE. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.nao.org.uk/report/investigation-into-the-educationfunding-agencys-oversight-of-related-party-transactions-at-durand-academy/
[https://perma.cc/6XPC-97ZA] [hereinafter Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE].
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1,155 ATs (40%) disclosed related-party transactions. 77 These
transactions increased to 3,033, totaling almost £121 million.78
Moreover, ATs had entered into 70 related-party transactions,
each of which exceeded £250,000.79
These transactions
80
amounted to almost £62 million.
The EFA began to record the frequency of related-party
transactions in the academy sector because of the irregularities
involving the Durand Academy Trust.81 This AT ran an early
years center—comparable to pre-K—as well as a primary and
secondary school. 82 Because of problems revealed in the AT’s
financial statements, the EFA investigated the trust’s relatedparty transactions. 83
This investigation identified two
particularly troubling arrangements. The first transaction was
with a company owned by the executive head for the
management of the AT’s leisure and accommodation facilities.84
This company received £790,000 for the management of these
properties over a three-year period.85 The second involved a
contract for public relations and communications with a
company owned by one of the trustees.86 This company
received £20,000 per month for its services. 87 The EFA ordered
the trust to terminate its contract with the executive head’s
77. Academy School Sector in England: Consolidated annual report and accounts
for
the
year
ended
31
August
2016,
DEP’T
FOR
EDUC.,
115,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/654811/Academy_Schools_Sector_in_England_Consolidated_Annual_Report_and_
AccountFalsepdf [https://perma.cc/X296-NAZ3].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Rajeev Syal, Nearly Half of Academy Trusts Paid Millions to ‘Dubious’
Contracts,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/nov/13/nearly-half-academy-trusts-relatedparty-transactions [https://perma.cc/9B3A-ENH5].
82. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 7. Because of
concerns over finances and conflicts of interests, the Department for Education terminated
its funding agreement with the Durand Academy Trust in 2018. Freddie Whittaker,
Troubled Durand Academy Reopens as Van Gogh Primary, but Land Issues
Continue, S CHS . W EEK . (Sep. 7, 2018), https://schoolsweek.co.uk/troubled durand-academy-reopens-as-van-gogh-primary-but-land-issues-continue/
[https://perma.cc/7KT4-WAH3].
83. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 5.
84. Id. at 15.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 16.
87. Id.
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company. 88 With respect to the trustee’s company, the EFA
instructed the trust either to end the contract when it expired or
conduct an open bidding process if the trust still needed the
services. 89
The related-party transactions involving the Wakefield City
Academies Trust (“WCAT”) also garnered much media
attention.90 In 2015, this MAT, which sponsored 21 primary
and secondary schools throughout Yorkshire, had received £10
million in funding from the DfE to set up “high-performing
academy hubs in areas having some of the greatest need.”91
However, in the following year, the MAT came under scrutiny
after it was revealed that it paid £440,000 to companies owned
by the CEO and his daughter.92 The MAT declared in a
statement that the contracts were appropriate because they had
been put out to bid.93 However, a leaked DfE report identified
16 breaches of academy finance rules committed by WCAT,
including the trust paying the CEO £82,000 for less than 15
weeks of work.94 This lack of governance and financial
management put WCAT “in an extremely vulnerable
88. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 21.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Rebecca Akrofile, Academy Chain Comes under Fire for Financial
Conflicts
of
Interest,
THE
EDUCATOR
(Oct.
26,
2016),
https://www.theeducator.com/news/academy-chain-comes-fire-financial-conflicts-interest/;
Will Hazell, Wakefield City Academy Trust Paid £83K to Former CEO’s Firm, TES (Jan.
30, 2018), https://www.tes.com/news/wakefield-city-academies-trust-paid-ps83k-formerceos-firm [https://perma.cc/2MZW-3RMF]; John Roberts & Don Mort, Yorkshire Academy
Chain Defends Spending More Than £300,000 on IT Deal with Firm Run by Its Own Boss,
YORKSHIRE
P OST
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/education/yorkshire-academy-chain-defendsspending-more-than-300-000-on-it-deal-with-firm-run-by-its-own-boss-1-8196191
[https://perma.cc/K3RH-UN7N]; Sonia Sodha, The Great Academy Schools Scandal, THE
GUARDIAN (Jul. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2018 /jul/22/academyschools-scandal-failing-trusts [https://perma.cc/78H5-49K8].
91. Dep’t for Educ. & the Rt Hon. Nicky Morgan, Speech: Nicky Morgan: one
nation education, GOV.UK (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
nicky-morgan-one-nation-education [https://perma.cc/3YUY-QA32].
92. Eleanor Busby, Academy Chain Spends £440,000 on Deals with Firms Run by
CEO and His Daughter, TES (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.tes.com/news/academy-chainspends-ps440000-deals-firms-run-ceo-and-his-daughter [https://perma.cc/A3S4-KZET].
93. Id.
94. Eleanor Busby, Exclusive: ‘Extreme’ DfE Concern over Academy Trust that
Paid
CEO
£82K
for
15
Weeks’
Work,
TES
(Nov.
4,
2016),
https://www.tes.com/news/exclusive-extreme-dfe-concern-over-academy-trust-paid-ceops82k-15-weeks-work [https://perma.cc/EJD8-JFNQ].
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position.”95 In September 2017, WCAT declared that it was
dissolving and ceasing the operation of its academy schools. 96
Parliament has expressed concerns about the EFA’s ability
to police related-party transactions in the academy sector. For
instance, in a 2014 report, the House of Commons Committee of
Public Accounts expressed that the “Agency might not know the
true extent of related-party transactions in all education
providers—even if it implements sophisticated monitoring
arrangements—in the same way that the accountability system
in local authority settings might identify these transactions.”97
Similarly, a report commissioned by the Education Select
Committee, published in the same year, concluded that “the
checks and balances on academy trusts in relation to conflicts of
interest are still too weak.”98
Despite these concerns, the EFA has refused to outlaw
related-party transactions. 99 Instead, the agency has identified a
number of benefits to these business deals. For instance, the
EFA has asserted that related-party transactions can reduce costs
through economies of scale. 100 Specifically, the AT can achieve
economies of scale by sharing services, such as facilities
management services or catering or staffing. 101 ATs can also
benefit from the “in-house” expertise—especially in situations
where the “trust is related to a recognized national lead in a
given area.”102 It has also sought to improve the monitoring
95. Id.
96. Press Ass’n, Failing Academy Trust to Pull out of 21 Schools, THE GUARDIAN
(Sep. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/education/ 2017/sep/09 /failing-academytrust-to-pull-out-of-21-schools [https://perma.cc/H7AQ-NMEN].
97. Education Funding Agency and Department for Education financial statements:
Sixty-first Report of Session 2013-14, HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMTE. PUB. ACCTS., 12
(May
12,
2014),
https://publications.parliament.uk
/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubacc/1063/1063.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW6U-J35C].
98. TOBY GREANY & JEAN SCOTT, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN ACADEMY
SPONSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS : A REPORT FOR THE EDUCATION SELECT COMMITTEE 3
(Sep.
2014),
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commonscommittees/Education/Conflicts-of-interest-in-academies-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LAR6-GAQ2].
99. HOUSE OF COMMONS EDUC. COMMTE., ACADEMIES AND FREE SCHOOLS
(FOURTH
REPORT
OF
SESSION
2014-15)
46
(Jan.
21,
2015),
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/Education/report-educationacademies-and-schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6Y4-7ZNJ].
100. Review of Related Party Transactions, supra note 75, at 21.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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system of related-party transactions. We analyze these attempts
in the following section.

IV. MONITORING OF RELATED-PARTY
TRANSACTIONS BY CHARTER SCHOOLS AND
ACADEMIES103
A. Monitoring Systems for Related-Party Transactions
in Charter Schools and Academies
Governmental entities have implemented monitoring
systems to protect against the abuse of related-party transactions
in the charter-school and academy sectors. Table 1 provides a
depiction of these monitoring systems in tabular form.

Table 1: Monitoring Systems for Related-Party
Transactions for Charter Schools and Academies

Ensure that relatedparty transactions
are properly
documented and in
the schools’ best
interest
Review related
party contracts for
possible conflict of
interest
Provide fiscal
oversight to protect
against related
party transactions

Charter Schools
(States)104
External Auditors

Academies
(National) 105
External Auditors

Charter School
Boards

AT Boards

Charter Authorizers

Education and
Skills Funding
Agency (ESFA)

103. An earlier version of the U.S. charter-school monitoring system analysis
appeared in Preston C. Green III et al., Are Charter Schools the Second Coming of Enron:
An Examination of the Gatekeepers That Protect Against Dangerous Related -Party
Transactions in the Charter School Sector, 93 IND. L. J. 1121 (2018).
104. Id. at 1142-57.
105. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
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An examination of the related-party transaction monitoring
systems for EMOs and ATs reveals noteworthy similarities.
First, each system employs external auditors who are charged
with ensuring that all related-party transactions are properly
documented.106 Second, each monitoring system relies on
governing boards that review related-party transactions for
possible conflicts of interest. In the case of charter schools, the
autonomous charter school boards that contract with the EMOs
perform this function. 107 The ATs perform this role in the
academy monitoring system. 108 Third, each monitoring system
has entities that provide general fiscal oversight to protect
against related-party transactions.109 In the case of charter
schools, the charter authorizer plays that role. 110 The Education
and Skills Funding Agency (“ESFA”), a departmental agency
sponsored by the DfE,111 performs this task for academies.112
Finally, each system has an entity that investigates allegations
made by whistleblowers. 113 In the charter school systems,
charter school authorizers, state auditors, and state departments
of education are responsible for these investigations. 114 The
ESFA and DfE perform this role with respect to academies. 115
It is also important to note that in the case of charter
schools, the federal government has not played a prominent role
in the policing of related-party transactions. The federal
government has spent more than $4 billion since 1995 to
encourage the growth of charter schools without emphasizing
106. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1142-46; Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFF.,
supra note 76, at 25.
107. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1150-53.
108. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
109. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1150-53; Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT
OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
110. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1150-53.
111. EDUC. & SKILLS FUND. AGENCY, ABOUT US , https://www.gov.uk/government
/organisations/education-and-skills-funding-agency/about [https://perma.cc/FTY5-NJZP].
112. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
113. Id.
114. Green et al., supra note 103, at 1154-56.
115. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
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oversight.116 The OIG signaled that it would take a more
involved role in policing related-party transactions in its 2016
audit. In fact, the report made several suggestions for improving
oversight of related-party transactions, including improving the
Department’s
monitoring
of
charter
school-EMO
relationships. 117 However, President Donald Trump, who came
into office after this audit was published, has expressed general
displeasure of federal regulations. 118 Moreover, his Secretary of
Education, Betsy DeVos, has also displayed antipathy toward
federal regulations. 119 Therefore, we have not included the
federal government as part of the charter-school, related-partytransaction monitoring system.
The remainder of this section analyzes the monitoring
systems for protecting against the abuse of related-party
transactions in the charter and academy sectors and makes
suggestions for improvement.

B. Auditors
1. Charter Schools
Most charter laws require charter schools to submit to
annual financial audits that comply with statutory or regulatory

116. Dustin Beilke, New Grants Announced: ED Continues to Pour Millions into
Charter School Black Hole, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOC. PRWATCH (Sep. 29, 2016),
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/09/13151/education-department-continues-pourmillions-tax-dollars-charter-school-blackhole [https://perma.cc/2R8J-7LUK].
117. Supra note 71, at 30-31.
118. Terry Jones, Deregulation Nation: President Trump Cuts Regulation at Record
Rate, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Aug. 14, 2018, https://www.investors.com/politics/
commentary/deregulation-nation-president-trump-cuts-regulations-at-record-rate/
[https://perma.cc/3R32-9H5Q].
119. See, e.g., David Whitman & Arne Duncan, Betsy DeVos and Her Cone of
Silence
on
For-Profit
Colleges,
BROOKINGS
(Oct.
17,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/betsy-devos-for-profit-colleges-education-america/
[https://perma.cc/E5JD-B35D]; Elissa Nadworthy, DeVos to Make It Tougher for
Defrauded Students to Seek Debt Relief, NPRED (July 27, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/07/27/633107206/devos-to-make-it-tougher-fordefrauded-students-to-seek-debt-relief
[https://perma.cc/3HGG-ATFG];
Valerie
Richardson, DeVos Moves to Roll Back Regulations on Federal Aid to Religious Colleges,
WASH.
TIMES
(May
10,
2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/may/10/devos-moves-roll-back-regulationsfederal-aid-reli/ [https://perma.cc/C2FY-9KU6].
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standards.120 Although state laws require auditors to be truly
independent, there have been instances where auditors failed to
detect problematic related-party transactions because they were
under the control of the EMO.121 Therefore, charter authorizers
must take special care to guarantee that auditors are actually
independent.
Researchers have also advised auditors of charter schools to
scrutinize related-party transactions for evidence of abuse. As
Marie Blouin and Ronald Huefner observe: “In addition to
traditional public school audit issues, charter school audits also
require consideration of the appropriateness and review of
contracts and transactions with the sponsoring organization,”
and “conflicts of interest by board members, especially if they
have ties to the sponsoring organization.” 122 This focus would
be consistent with the two main standards used by charterschool auditors: generally accepted auditing standards
(“GAAS”), and generally accepted government auditing
standards (“GAGAS”). 123 Both standards require auditors to
consider the possible risks of fraud intrinsic to the entities that
they are investigating. 124
GAAS refers to the standards, established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), that apply to
the “ordinary audit of financial statements by the independent
auditor.”125 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-6F-6(g)(5) (2018) (requiring audits to comply with
generally accepted accounting principles); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-505 (Wet 2018)
(requiring audits to comply with generally accepted auditing principles); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 47605(l) (West 2018) (requiring audits to comply with generally accepted accounting
principles); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-104(4)(a) (West 2018) (requiring audits to
comply with state department of education requirements); DC CODE §
38.1802.04(c)(11)(B)(ix) (2018) (requiring audits to comply with standards issued by U.S.
Comptroller General); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302D-32 (West 2018) (requiring audits to
comply with standards set by authorizer and state department).
121. See Green et al., supra note 103, at 26 for examples.
122. Ronald Huefner & Marie Blouin, Control Issues in Charter Schools: An
Examination of New York State’s Comptroller’s Audits, CPA J. (Apr. 2018),
https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/04/30/control-issues-in-charter-schools/
[https://perma.cc/MM47-X9CA].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AU SECTION 110:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR 1593, 1593 (Nov.
1972),
https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/Downloadable
Documents/AU-00110.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XM27-ED9E].
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requires auditors to conduct “brainstorming” sessions to
determine how a client might be vulnerable to fraud.126 SAS 109
requires auditors to understand the entity and its environment,
evaluate the attendant risks of material misstatements, and
address significant risks that require special consideration.127
Established by the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”), GAGAS sets the standards for auditors of
governmental entities.128 GAGAS requires auditors to identify
any “laws, regulations, contracts or grant agreements that are
significant within the context of the audit objectives.” 129 This
consideration requires auditors to design auditing procedures “to
obtain reasonable assurance of detecting instances of
noncompliance.”130

2. Academies
The Academies Financial Handbook, which sets out the
guidelines for the financial management of ATs, requires these
entities to appoint an auditor to “certify whether their annual
accounts present a true and fair view of the trust’s financial
performance and position.” 131 In 2013, the ESFA amended that
Handbook to require ATs to pay no more than the costs of goods
provided by related parties.132
In 2014, the Handbook
126.
AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS., AU SECTION 316:
CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT, 1719, 1724,
https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU00316.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8D9-EV9Y].
127.
AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AU SECTION 314:
UNDERSTANDING THE ENTITY AND ITS ENVIRONMENT AND ASSESSING THE RISKS OF
MATERIAL
MISSTATEMENT
1667,
1673,
1691-94,
https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU00314.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7EP-GUGV].
128. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS : 2011
REVISION (Dec. 2011), http://gao.gov/assets/590/587281.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7ERC6NY].
129. Id. at 140.
130. Id.
131. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018:
FOR ACADEMY TRUSTEES, MEMBERS, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICERS
AND
AUDITORS
36
(Sep.
1,
2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academies-financial-handbook
[https://perma.cc/LPX7-AAPV].
132. EDUC. FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2013: FOR
ACADEMY TRUSTEES, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS AND
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introduced a de minimis threshold of £2,500 on at-cost
requirements that applied to related-party transactions. 133 ATs
had to pay no more than cost for any transaction above this
limit.134 The National Audit Office (“NAO”)135—Parliament’s
auditing body136—as well as Parliament 137 have expressed doubt
that auditors can enforce the at cost policy. One concern is that
it will be difficult for auditors to assess professional services,
especially “where the academy is effectively buying-in an
expert’s time and knowledge rather than goods with an historic
cost.”138 Another problem that auditors face is that the at-cost
policy can be subject to manipulation. 139
Instead of enforcing the at cost policy, we believe it would
be wiser for auditors to develop protocols for identifying and
scrutinizing particularly risky related-party transactions. This
advice would be consistent with International Standard of
Auditing 550—a standard that academy auditors must
follow140—which governs related-party transactions.141 As the
standard explains, “an understanding of the entity’s related party
relationships and transactions is relevant to the auditors’
evaluation of whether one or more fraud risk factors are
present . . . because fraud may be more easily committed
through related parties.”142
AUDITORS 25 (Sep. 1, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academiesfinancial-handbook-2013 [https://perma.cc/2B8E-TMV3].
133. Id.
134. EDUC. FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2014: FOR
ACADEMY TRUSTEES, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS AND
AUDITORS 6 (Sep. 1, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/academiesfinancial-handbook-2014 [https://perma.cc/F3KY-8VTS].
135. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 6.
136.
NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, ABOUT US, https://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/9KQW-MAVW].
137. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. PUB. ACCOUNTS., ACADEMY SCHOOLS’
FINANCES: THIRTIETH REPORT OF SESSION 2017-19 10 (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/760/760.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJY6-EYE3].
138. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 6.
139. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMM. PUB. ACCOUNTS., supra note 137, at 5.
140. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 9.
141. INT’L FED ’N OF ACCOUNTANTS, INT’L AUDITING & ASSURANCE STANDARDS
BD., INT ’L STANDARDS
OF
AUDITING 550
503
(Dec.
15,
2009),
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/a029-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-550.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SC5X-DSQN].
142. Id. at 505-06.

2019

SAME SCAMS, DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

429

We believe that auditors should pay particular attention to
related-party transactions involving the senior executive leaders
of ATs—these are principals for ATs143 and chief executive
officers for MATs.144 According to the Handbook, these
persons should serve as their trusts’ accounting officers. 145
Accounting officers have a personal responsibility to Parliament
and to the ESFA for the trusts’ finances. 146 It is quite possible
that senior executive leaders who are engaged in questionable
related-party transactions might use their positions as accounting
officers to cover their tracks.

C. Charter School and AT Boards
1. Charter School Governing Boards
Charter school governing boards are legally responsible for
ensuring the fiscal soundness of their schools. 147 However,
charter school governing boards may be unprepared to fulfill
this duty because they lack either the training or the
independence to assess the related-party transactions of their
EMO agents. In the Renaissance Academy for Math & Science
case, for example, one board member testified at trial that he
incorrectly believed that Imagine Schools had control over the
board.148 This testimony led the district court to describe the
member as being “very confused” about his board duties. 149 The
court also found that the governing board was subservient to
Imagine Schools because the EMO had recruited the board
members and had the board sign an operating agreement that
allocated all tax revenues received by the board to the EMO.150

143. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018,
supra note 125, at 42.
144. Id. at 41.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Preston C. Green, III, et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to
Obtain Funding of Private Schools and the Autonomy of Public Schools, 63 EMORY L. J.
303, 304 (2013).
148. Renaissance Acad. for Math & Sci. of Mo., Inc. v. Imagine Sch., Inc., No 4:13CV-00645-NKL, 2014 WL 3858401, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 4, 2014) .
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
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Charter school statutes should address the board training
problem by ensuring that board members receive training with
respect to their supervisory responsibilities. Indeed, 13 states
require governing boards to receive training: Colorado,151
Delaware,152
Florida, 153
Georgia,154
Massachusetts,155
Minnesota,156 Mississippi, 157 Nevada, 158 New Jersey, 159 New
Mexico,160 Tennessee,161 Texas,162 and Wisconsin. 163 Five of
these states—Delaware,164 Florida,165 Minnesota,166 New
Mexico,167 and Texas168—specifically include coverage of
financial management in their training provisions. In addition to
training requirements, states should require governing boards to
possess expertise in financial management. Only three states—
Hawaii, 169 Louisiana, 170 and South Carolina171—impose this
requirement on their charter school governing boards.
Charter school laws should also guarantee that governing
boards are structurally independent from EMOs. Nine states do
provide this guarantee.
These states are Colorado,172
173
174
Connecticut,
Illinois,
Indiana,175 Maine,176 Michigan,177
151. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 301-88:2.01(C) (West 2018).
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1803 (West 2018).
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1022.33(9)(j)(4) (West 2018).
154. GA. CODE ANN., § 20-2-2084(f) (West 2018).
155. 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.06 (West 2018).
156. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.07(Subd. 7) (West 2018).
157. 10-402 MISS. CODE REGS. § 2.5 (West 2018).
158. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.246(20) (West 2018).
159. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:32–3.2(a)(2) (West 2018).
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.1 (West 2018).
161. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-111(o) (West 2017).
162. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.123 (West 2017).
163. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (2r)(2)(j) (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40
(2x)(2)(j) (West 2017).
164. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14, § 1803 (West 2019).
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(f)(1) (West 2019).
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127A.19 (West 2019).
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.1 (West 2019).
168. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.123(b)(3)(A) (West 2019).
169. HAW. REV. STAT. § 302D-12(b)(3) (West 2018).
170. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 2101(D)(2) (2018).
171. S.C. STAT. § 59-40-50(B)(9) (2018).
172. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(4)(b) (West 2018).
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(e) (West 2018).
174. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/27A-10.5(e) (West 2018).
175. IND. CODE ANN ; § 20-24-3-2.5(4) (West 2018).
176. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8) (West 2018).
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Mississippi, 178 Nevada, 179 and Rhode Island.180 Further, several
of these states provide indicia for determining whether a charter
school governing board is independent from its EMO:
1)The EMO must not select the members of the governing
board;181
2)The governing board must select, retain, and compensate
the attorney and auditing firm representing the board; 182
3)The governing board and the EMO must reach the terms
of the service contract through arms-length negotiations;
and183
4)The EMO must not have control over financial
decisions.184

Charter school board principals may also fail at assessing
the related-party transactions of EMOs because board members
have related-party transactions with the charter schools for
which they are responsible.
Initially, such business
arrangements may not seem problematic because, typically,
under nonprofit corporations law, members of these boards can
recuse themselves from decisions to enter into business
arrangements with their companies. However, one wonders
whether charter school boards can carry out their fiduciary
duties with respect to the EMO if they also have business
arrangements with the charter school. Might they be so
distracted by their own financial interests that they fail to police
the behavior of the EMO?
The predicament of PA Cyber Charter School (PA Cyber)
illustrates this concern. At its peak, PA Cyber had an
enrollment of more than 11,000 students across the state.185 An
audit conducted by the state auditor general revealed that the
charter school paid the EMO that provided curriculum and
177. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.507(1)(f) (West 2018).
178. 10-402 MISS. CODE R. § 1.12(D) (West 2018).
179. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.393(1)(a) (West 2018).
180. R.I. Reg. Text 496815 (West 2018).
181. 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(A) (West 2018).
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66tt(e); 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(B);
R.I. Reg. Text 496815.
183. IND. CODE ANN; § 20-24-3-2.5(4); 05-071 ME. CODE R. Ch. 140, § 2(8)(C); 10402 MISS. CODE R. § 1.12(D)(1).
184. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388A.393(1)(a).
185.
Trombetta
Pleads
Guilty,
MORNING J.
(Aug.
25,
2016),
http://www.morningjournalnews.com/news/local-news/2016/08/trombetta-pleads-guilty/
[https://perma.cc/NRX9-PUY8].
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management services to the schools more than $153 million
from 2011 to 2014, which amounted to nearly half of the
school’s annual budget.186 The auditing office was especially
critical of the terms of the management services agreement
between the charter school and the EMO.187 Instead of using a
cost-based fee formula, the agreement stipulated that the EMO
would receive 12 percent of the charter school’s revenues
received from the state and enrolling school districts.188 By not
basing payment on actual costs, the state auditor declared that
the fee structure weakened the level of accountability demanded
of the EMO.189 The auditing office also found that board
members had related-party transactions that compromised their
ability to provide oversight over the management company. 190
For instance, a board member’s son was a director of operations
for the EMO.191 Another board member was a co-owner of a
computer equipment company that was paid $1.1 million from
the charter school. 192
The state auditor general expressed displeasure that neither
the state’s charter school law nor its ethics statute prohibited
governing board members from simultaneously serving as
officers and board members of companies that were providing
services to PA Cyber.193 As he explained, “such situations
provide an appearance of a conflict of interest that should be
mitigated.”194 One of the solutions that the auditor general
suggested to fix this problem was to make charter school boards
publicly elected.195 It is doubtful whether this amendment
186. PA. DEP’T AUDITOR GEN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT : PENNSYLVANIA CYBER
CHARTER
SCHOOL
28
(Sep.
2016)
[hereinafter
,
http://www.paauditor.gov/Media/Default/Reports/PACyberCharterSchool,%20Beaver,%20
092116.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5WE-9SX8].
187. Id. at 29.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. PENNSYLVANIA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, supra note 186, at 19.
192. Id. at 21.
193. Id. at 17.
194. Call To Overhaul PA Charter School Law: Auditor General Calls It The Worst
In
The
Nation,
NEXTSTAR
BROADCASTING,
(Sept.
22,
2016),
https://www.wearecentralpa.com/news/call-to-overhaul-pa-charter-school-law/558591274
[https://perma.cc/74J5-69TP].
195. PA. DEP’T AUDITOR GEN., AUDITOR GENERAL DEP ASQUALE SAYS AUDITS OF
PA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL, TWO OTHER SCHOOLS REAFFIRM NEED TO OVERHAUL
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would counter the specific oversight problem that occurred in
the case of PA Cyber: i.e., board members who might have
failed to provide oversight over the EMO because they too were
benefiting from related-party transactions with the charter
school. Rather, legislatures should consider prohibiting board
members from engaging in related-party transactions with the
charter schools for which they are responsible. Indeed, two
states—Minnesota196 and New Mexico197—have addressed this
concern by prohibiting persons from serving on a governing
board if they or their immediate family members own or have a
significant stake in any entity providing “professional services,
goods, or facilities” to the charter school.

2. Academies
AT governing boards have the responsibility of “ensuring
resources are allocated to strategic priorities and safeguarding
the highest standards of highest priority”—this responsibility
encompasses related-party transactions.198
The Handbook
commands boards to meet this duty by ensuring that
“requirements for managing related party transactions are
applied across the trust” and by “manag[ing] personal
relationships with related parties to avoid real and perceived
conflicts of interest.”199
There have been a number of instances in which trustees of
MATs have benefited from questionable related-party
transactions between the MATs and the businesses that they
run.200 The Bright Tribe Multi-Academy Trust is an egregious
CHARTER SCHOOL LAW (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.paauditor.gov/press-releases/auditorgeneral-depasquale-says-audits-of-pa-cyber-charter-school-two-other-schools-reaffirmneed-to-overhaul-charter-school-law [https://perma.cc/BP2J-4ZSU].
196. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124E.07(subdiv. 3)(a) (West 2018).
197. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-5.2(A) (West 2018).
198. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 4.
199. EDUC. & SKILLS FUND, AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018,
supra note 131, at 30.
200. See, e.g., John Dickens, Revealed: The 23 Trusts that Broke Rules over £4M
Related-Party
Transactions,
SCHS.
WK.
(Feb.
3,
2017),
https://schoolsweek.co.uk/revealed-the-23-trusts-that-broke-rules-over-4m-related-partytransactions/ [https://perma.cc/N7WR-5W5E]; Jonathan Owen, Exclusive: Former
Academy Trustee’s Firm Billed More than £6M in ‘Related-Party’ Payments, TES, (Nov. 7,
2017),
https://www.tes.com/news/exclusive-former-academy-trustees-firm-billed-moreps6m-related-party-payments [https://perma.cc/G2MX-6F6K].
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example. This MAT, which ran 10 academy schools, paid
companies owned by its director £3.9 million in 2016 and
£681,000 in 2017.201 A governmental investigation of the MAT
revealed that 80% of its governors had engaged in related-party
transactions.202 Arrangements such as this one raise doubts as to
whether board members are fulfilling their responsibility to
protect the financial interests of their MATs.
The Handbook further advises trustees to refer to the
guidance provided by the Charity Commission,203 the regulatory
body for all charities in England and Wales. 204 The Charity
Commission’s document titled The Essential Trustee: What You
Need to Know, What You Need to Do provides that the actions a
board takes with respect to related-party transactions depends
“on the circumstances and the seriousness of the conflict of
interest.”205 Generally, the affected trustee should be absent
from any part of the meeting where the issue is being
discussed.206 The affected trustee should withdraw from any
decision-making on that issue.207
However, Gillian Allcroft, the Deputy Chief Executive of
the
National
Governance
Association
(“NGA”)—an
independent charity that seeks to increase the effectiveness of
AT governing boards208—doubts whether this approach is
sufficient in situations that “involve significant financial

201. Helen Ward, Exclusive: Bright Tribe Pays £680K in Related-Party
Transactions, TES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.tes.com/news/exclusive-bright-tribe-paysps680k-related-party-transactions [https://perma.cc/ZAS8-HHXY].
202. Pippa Allen-Kinros, Embattled Bright Tribe Academy Trust to Close, SCHS.
WEEK. (July 16, 2018), https://schoolsweek.co.uk/embattled-bright-tribe-academy-trust-toclose/ [https://perma.cc/ND75-B53S].
203. Supra note 131, at 10.
204.
CHARITY COMM ’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, ABOUT US,
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about
[https://perma.cc/J3ZT-3FDD] (last visited March 30, 2019).
205. CHARITY COMM ’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, THE ESSENTIAL TRUSTEE: WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW, WHAT YOU NEED TO DO 18 (May 3, 2018),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-essential-trustee-what-you-need-toknow-cc3/the-essential-trustee-what-you-need-to-know-what-you-need-to-do
[https://perma.cc/29F5-WPGX].
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. NAT ’L GOV. ASS’N., WELCOME TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNANCE
ASSOCIATION, https://www.nga.org.uk/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Z9B-8S5D] (last
visited March 30, 2019).
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perspective of an AT board):
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As she explains (from the

If you award a firm closely associated with a trustee a
contract will you genuinely be able to demonstrate that you
weren’t influenced by her/his status?. . .The truth is
regardless of how stringent you have been with your
processes the perception that the trustee has benefited will
linger. Alternatively, you may unconsciously look for
reasons not to award the trustee’s firm the contract to avoid
such a charge—but they have may have been the best
provider. Neither outcome is satisfactory. Better not to put
oneself in that position in the first place. 210

The guidance provided by the Charity Commission lends
some support to Allcroft’s skepticism. For example, The
Essential Trustee advises that in cases involving serious
conflicts, the company should take one of the following actions:
(1) obtain permission from the Commission; (2) refrain from
going forward with the conflict; or (3) require the trustee to
resign. 211
Similarly, the Commission’s document titled
Conflicts of Interest: A Guide for Charity Trustees provides that
in situations involving serious conflicts of interest, charity
boards should remove the conflict by: (1) “not pursuing the
course of action”; (2) “proceeding with the issue in a different
way so that the conflict of interest does not arise”; or (3) “not
appointing a particular trustee or securing a trustee
resignation.”212
As noted above, in the United States charter-school context,
two states have found that related-party transactions between
board members or their immediate families are so serious that
they cannot be resolved by having the affected members absent
themselves from discussions and excuse themselves from
deliberations. Instead, these states have banned such persons
from serving on charter school governing boards. Given the
209. Gillian Allcroft, Ethical Goverance and Leadership, 7 ACAD. MAG. 28 (Aug.
2017), http://academymag.co.uk/ [https://perma.cc/54XA-SMXQ].
210. Id.
211. CHARITY COMM’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, THE ESSENTIAL TRUSTEE, supra
note 205.
212. CHARITY COMM ’N FOR ENGLAND & WALES, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: A
GUIDE
FOR
CHARITY
TRUSTEES
5
(May
1,
2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflicts-of-interest-a-guide-for-charitytrustees-cc29 [https://perma.cc/X9F8-EMNP].
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concerns raised about related-party transactions compromising
the ability of AT boards to act as fiscal stewards, Parliament
might consider imposing a similar ban.
One might ask why we would call for Parliament to
consider banning related-party transactions for AT board
members, but not call for a similar ban on the AT’s senior
executives. We respond by acknowledging that related-party
transactions can provide opportunities for ATs to obtain
economies of scale and in-house expertise.213 But we also
recognize that a core function of AT boards is “to oversee
financial performance and make sure money is well spent.” 214 If
evidence suggests that related-party transactions are
compromising the ability of boards to carry out this duty, then a
ban would be appropriate.

C. Authorizers & ESFA
1. Charter Schools
Charter school authorizers review applications to determine
whether to grant charters, monitor the schools for which they are
responsible, and decide whether to revoke or renew charters.215
Charter school authorizers are “ultimately responsible for the
fiscal oversight of each charter school they oversee.” 216 Their
duty to ensure the fiscal health of charter schools extends “from
application approval to oversight and monitoring to closure or
renewal.”217
Consequently, authorizers play a pivotal role in guarding
against unreasonable related-party transactions between EMOs

213. Review of Related Party Transactions, supra note 75, at 21.
214. DEP’T FOR EDUC., GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 25.
215. Jennifer Thomsen, Charter Authorizers: What they are & why they matter,
EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, www.ecs.org [https://perma.cc/AX3V-8TSM]
(last visited March 6, 2019).
216. A User’s Guide to Fiscal Oversight: A Toolkit for Charter School Authorizers
2,
NAT ’L
CHARTER
SCH.
RESOURCE
CTR.
(2016),
https://www.charterschoolcenter.org/sites/default/files/Fiscal%20Oversight%20Toolkit%2
0-%20Authorizers%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/4R3U-N6PK].
217. Id.
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and for-profit related parties. 218 However, only two states—
California and Connecticut—explicitly empower authorizers to
review and approve these business arrangements. 219 California’s
law will go into effect on July 1, 2019. 220 On that date, the law
stipulates that petitions for charter school applications, renewals
or material revisions “shall not operate as, or be operated by . . .
a for-profit educational management organization.”221 The law
defines the term “operate as, or be operated by” to encompass
the day-to-day management of a charter school.222 The statute
forbids charter schools from entering into subcontracts “to avoid
the requirements of this paragraph.”223 Consequently, this law
appears to prevent nonprofit EMOs from contracting with forprofit related-parties for day-to-day operations. 224 Connecticut’s
administrative code places a number of limitations on relatedparty transactions. 225 These transactions are permissible under
the following conditions:
[T]he costs incurred are (1) limited to the actual cost of
goods or services; (2) applicable, appropriate and necessary
to the transaction; and (3) do not exceed the fair market rate
or value that a prudent person in a non-related party
transaction would incur under the circumstances prevailing
at the time. 226

We have two concerns with California’s approach. First,
we oppose the idea of banning related-party transactions
involving for-profit entities. Although we are concerned with
the abuse of these types of contractual arrangements, we cannot
rule out the possibility that in some instances, a related-party
transaction might constitute the best deal for the charter school.
218. Roxana Marachi, Is Charter School Fraud the New Enron?, EDURESEARCHER
(March
16,
2017),
https://eduresearcher.com/2017/03/16/charter-enron/
[https://perma.cc/HR3V-V92H].
219. See generally CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47604 (West 2019); C.G.S.A. §§ 10-66m-110-66mm-7 (West 2019).
220. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47604(b)(1) (2018).
221. Id.
222. Id. § (2)(A)(iii).
223. Id. § (2)(B).
224. Derek Black, California Strikes Major Blow for Non-Profit Charter Schools,
EDUC.
L.
PROF.
BLOG
(Sep.
10,
2018),
https://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/education_law/2018/09/california-strikes-major-blow-to-for-profit-charterschools.html [https://perma.cc/6KDT-D3RA].
225. See C.G.S.A. §§ 10-66m1-10-7mm.
226. C.G.S.A. § 10-66mm-5(c).
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Second, we find it troubling that California’s provision
addresses only contracts that deal with day-to-day management.
Thus, this language may fail to address other potential areas of
abuse, such as real estate.227 Instead, the bill provides that these
business agreements fall under the responsibility of charter
school boards. As we have explained above, states should
provide boards with training that addresses related-party
transactions so that they can be up to this task.228
By contrast, Connecticut’s regulations provide better
guidance for its authorizer, the state department of education.
By instructing the department to examine the appropriateness
and necessity of the related-party transaction and to ensure that
each transaction does not exceed fair market value, the
regulations call for the authorizer to guard against abuse while
allowing for the possibility that the transaction might provide
the best goods or services to the charter school. 229 However, we
advise other states to be wary of adopting Connecticut’s at-cost
requirement because of the concerns raised with respect to
academies. 230

2. Academies
The ESFA is responsible for providing financial oversight
over academy schools.231 This responsibility includes relatedparty transactions.232 In 2013, the Handbook required academy
trusts (ATs) to obtain approval for related-party transactions that
were “novel” or “contentious.”233 Novel transactions “are those
in which the academy trust has no experience, or are outside the
range of normal business activity for the trust.”234 Contentious
transactions are “those which might give rise to criticism of the
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Section III(B)(1).
See Section III(C)(1).
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47604(2)(A).
See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-66mm-5.
Sally Weale, MPs Criticise Failure to Tackle Excessive Salaries in Academies,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
30,
2018),
https://www.theguardian
.com/education/2018/mar/30/mps-criticise-government-oversight-of-academy-schoolfinances [https://perma.cc/UC57-VSBW].
232. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
233. EDUC. FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2013, supra
note 132, at 22-23.
234. Id. at 22.
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trust by the public or the media.” 235 In 2017, the Handbook was
amended to include “repercussive transactions”—”those which
are likely to cause pressure on other trusts to take a similar
approach and hence have wider financial implications.”236
The House of Commons expressed dissatisfaction with this
line of review, noting that “[i]n practice this means that the
majority of day to day related party transactions require no prior
approval.”237 Indeed, this legislative body expressed the
concern that the ESFA only became aware of most related-party
transactions when it reviewed the annual accounts.238 To
prevent the abuse of related-party transactions, the House of
Commons recommended that the ESFA amend the Handbook to
prohibit ATs from entering into related-party transactions
without the agency’s approval.239 The ESFA did not adopt the
House of Commons’ blanket recommendation to approve all
related-party transactions—probably because of the sheer size of
the academy sector. However, the agency did decide to impose
a requirement, starting in April 2019, that ATs must obtain prior
approval from the ESFA for contracts with a related party if a
single contract, or the sum of all contracts with that party in the
same financial year exceed £20,000.240
The ESFA £20,000-threshold requirement for targeting
related-party transactions is an improvement over the agency’s
policy requiring the review of novel, contentious, or
repercussive transactions. First, the monetary threshold policy
will actually trigger a review of related-party transactions in a
way that the prior policy did not. Second, by setting a monetary
threshold before conducting a review of the transactions
235. Id. at 23.
236. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2017:
FOR ACADEMY MEMBERS, TRUSTEES, ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICERS
AND
AUDITORS
30
(2017),
https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/academies-financial-handbook [https://perma.cc/FV4KKPDM].
237. HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, ACADEMY SCHOOL’S
FINANCES:
THIRTIETH
REPORT
OF
SESSION
2017-19
9
(2018),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/760/760.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BWG7-2QJE].
238. Id.
239. Id. at 5.
240. EDUC. & SKILLS FUNDING AGENCY, ACADEMIES FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 2018,
supra note 131, at 31.
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between an AT and a related party, the ESFA has taken steps to
avoid being overextended.

D. Charter School Authorizers/State Level Auditor &
ESFA
1. Charter Schools
Charter school monitoring systems authorize regulatory
agencies, including state departments of education and state
auditors, to conduct investigations when they receive notice of
possible abuses of related-party transactions. 241 These entities
rely heavily on whistleblowers to provide them with
information. 242 Therefore, state legislatures should consider
instituting approaches that would motivate whistleblowers to
expose wasteful or fraudulent related-party transactions.
Two federal statutes show that state legislatures could
encourage whistleblowers to come forward by offering them
financial awards. The first statute is the False Claims Act
(FCA),243 which imposes liability on any person who
“knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 244 The FCA
encourages whistleblowers to bring civil actions, or qui tam
lawsuits, on behalf of the federal government.245
Whistleblowers can obtain a bounty ranging from 15% to 25%
of the government’s recovery.246
The second statute is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).247 Enacted in
response to the financial crisis of 2008, this statute seeks to
prevent another economic meltdown by placing more stringent

241. Green et al., supra note 103 at 28-30.
242. CTR. POPULAR DEMOCRACY ET AL., RISKING PUBLIC MONEY : CALIFORNIA
CHARTER
SCHOOL
FRAUD
(Mar.
2015),
http://laschoolreport.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Charter-Schools-California-Report-b1-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4QF-9AV7].
243. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-33 (West 2018).
244. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
245. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(1), (c).
246. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d).
247. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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regulations on lenders and banks.248
Dodd-Frank also
encourages whistleblowers to expose violations of U.S.
securities laws through the establishment of a whistleblower
incentive program.249 Administered by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the whistleblower program gives
financial awards to whistleblowers for original information that
leads to monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million. 250
Whistleblower awards range from 10% to 30% of the sanction
amount.251
Both the FCA252 and Dodd-Frank253 protect whistleblowers
from retaliatory actions from their employers, such as discharge,
demotion, suspension, threats, or harassments, or any other
discrimination. These statutes also provide several remedies for
whistleblowers including reinstatement, double back pay,
litigation costs, and attorneys’ fees.254
The financial awards provided by the FCA and Dodd-Frank
have enabled the federal government to recover a great deal of
money. In 2017, the federal government recovered $3.7 billion
in settlements and judgments pursuant to the False Claims Act;
$3.4 billion came from qui tam lawsuits.255 The financial
incentives of the federal False Claims Act have been so
successful that more than 50% of states have enacted their own
false claims acts.256
Since 2011, the Dodd-Frank
whistleblowing incentive program has led to the imposition of
$1.5 billion in monetary sanctions.257
248. CTR. AM. PROGRESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF DODD-FRANK, IN 6 CHARTS
(March
27,
2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/
2017/03/27/429256/importance-dodd-frank-6-charts/ [https://perma.cc/MX3S-66WB].
249. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2018).
250. 15 U.S.C.A § 78u-6(a)(1).
251. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1).
252. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h)(1).
253. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
254. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h)(2) (FCA); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (Dodd-Frank)
255. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RECOVERS $3.7 BILLION FROM FALSE CLAIMS ACT
CASES IN FISCAL YEAR 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017
[https://perma.cc/7A4L-NEK5].
256. Marianne W. Nitsch, Note: Fraud on the Classroom: Why State False Claims
Acts Are Not the Solution to All Fraud on State and Local Governments, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1009, 1010 (2015).
257. Jason Zuckerman & Matt Stock, One Billion Reasons Why the SEC
Whistleblower Reward Program Is Effective, FORBES (July 18, 2017),
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Taking impetus from the FCA and Dodd-Frank, state
legislatures should consider developing whistleblower incentive
programs for their charter schools. Specifically, these programs
would do the following: (1) provide financial awards to
whistleblowers for coming forward with information that would
lead to a successful recovery of public funds; and (2) protect
whistleblowers from retaliatory employment actions by charter
schools, EMOs, or their affiliates.
Charter school investigatory bodies should also target
certain types of related-party transactions for periodic reviews.
For example, evidence suggests that related-party transactions
involving real estate poses a problem to the charter school
sector.258 To combat such abuse, investigatory bodies can
periodically examine the real estate deals to which charter
schools have entered.

2. Academies
The ESFA investigates financial irregularities in the
academy sector including those involving related-party
transactions. Similar to charter schools, the ESFA relies on
whistleblower revelations.259 In fact, a freedom of information
request revealed that from 2013 to 2017, whistleblowers
triggered 14 out of 15 investigations into academy finances.260
Thus, we examine the incentives provided for whistleblowers to
come forward with respect to AT whistleblowers.
The Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998261 and the
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ERRA) 2013262 protect
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/07/18/one-billion-reasons-why-the-secwhistleblower-reward-program-is-effective/#4d32d3cf3009
[https://perma.cc/LA7BQ9L9].
258. See Section II(A)(1).
259. Durand Academy, NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 76, at 25.
260. Jess Staufenberg, Over 90% of Investigations into Academy Finances Are a
Result of Whistleblowers, SCH. WEEK (July 10, 2017), https://schoolsweek.co.uk/over-90of-investigations-into-academy-finances-are-a-result-of-whistleblowers/
[https://perma.cc/8LFA-VVMQ].
261. See generally Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, c. 23 (Eng.),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/96XR4YSK].
262.
Enterprise & Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/CMG6TJ3S].
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“workers” who make disclosures in the public interest from
dismissal and detrimental treatment. To receive protection,
workers must reasonably believe that they are making
disclosures in the public interest.263 Protected disclosures
include criminal offenses, failure to comply with legal
obligations, and the concealment of these actions. 264 Workers
who believe they have suffered from retaliation may seek
financial compensation from an employment tribunal. 265
Neither the PIDA nor the ERRA includes a whistleblower
incentive program similar to Dodd Frank or the FCA. After the
passage of the ERRA, the U.K. government in 2013 initiated a
call for evidence to determine whether it should make other
changes in its whistleblowing framework.266
The call
considered, inter alia, whether the U.K. should provide financial
incentives to whistleblowers.267 A year later, the government
issued a response rejecting the adoption of financial
incentives.268 Although the government “remained unconvinced
that the introduction of financial incentives would change the
cultural landscape in a positive way,” it did allow that “in due
course,” it would consider employing financial incentives “in
specific organisations or in very specific types of cases.” 269
Given the number of questionable related-party transactions
occurring within academy trusts, the government might consider
adopting a whistleblower incentive program for this sector.
Furthermore, the ESFA should not wait for whistleblowers
to provide information for investigations. We suggest that once
an AT crosses the £20,000 threshold for transactions with a
related company, which would require approval from the ESFA,
the agency should conduct periodic reviews of that business
relationship. In 2016, Sir Amyas Morse, the Auditor General of
the NAO, provided support for this suggestion during a House
263. Id. at § 17.
264. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, supra note 261, at § 1.
265. Id. at § 3.
266. See generally Government Response, Department for Business Innovation &
Skills,
Whistleblowing
Framework
Call
for
Evidence
(June
2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/whistleblowing-framework-call-forevidence [https://perma.cc/R6QU-TPZ9].
267. Id. at 19.
268. Id. at 20.
269. Id. at 25.
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of Commons Education Committee discussing the financial
management of the DfE.270 Morse called for the DfE and the
ESFA to develop a number of “leading indicators” that would
cause the agency to investigate an AT. 271 One example for
further scrutiny involved situations where “there were a lot of
apparent conflict of interest issues to be managed.” 272

CONCLUSION
Related-party transactions involving private companies and
their for-profit affiliates have bedeviled both U.S. charter
schools and England’s academies. Using comparative legal
research methodologies, this article has attempted to determine
why the respective monitoring systems have had a difficult time
regulating related-party transactions and offer suggestions for
improvement. Because our review has found such remarkable
similarities between the monitoring systems for charter schools
and academies, it is unsurprising that the recommendations for
improving these monitoring systems are so similar.

270. See generally Education Committee, Financial Management at the Department
for Education, 2016, HC 203 (UK).
271. Id. at Q112.
272. Id.

